Theology

Panentheism and Ontological Containment

I’m told there has been some discussion of my recent pantheism post on Michael Sudduth’s Facebook page. Since I ditched my Facebook account a couple of years ago, and Michael’s page isn’t publicly accessible, I can’t interact directly with that discussion. However, a mutual friend was thoughtful enough to send me a copy of his own critical comments, which I reproduce here:

I think James’ note is too quick. For what sort of ontological containment is at play here? Clearly many sorts of containment, such that A contains B, don’t support the inference that P(A) if P(B) for just any property P. Consider mereological containment, where A contains B just if B is a part (or perhaps proper part) of A. A very large clock tower — Big Ben, say — has many proper parts less than 1′ tall. But it doesn’t begin to follow that the same goes for Big Ben; it doesn’t follow that Big Ben, too, is less than 1′ tall.

Much the same goes for spatial containment, which James’ himself seems to dismiss as a relevent sort of ontological containment. My carton of non-fat milk and the refrigerator in which it’s contained have, among other things, very different dimensions and construction. Further, the milk can have soured and yet it still be false that the same goes for the refrigerator.

Perhaps, then, the relevant notion of ontological containment is that displayed by sets and their members. But this, too, won’t do, for of course while 7 is prime, then same can’t properly be said of (e.g.) the set of natural numbers of which 7 is a member.

Of course there’s much more to be said here. No doubt there are other notions of ontological containment which will support the general inference above, as well as (otherwise) faithfully capturing what the panentheist means to assert. Or perhaps we need to look more closely into relevant types of property; perhaps there are properties of some type, such that any property of that type does apply to the container if they apply to the contained item.

These are useful comments that raise some important issues. Here are some thoughts in response:

Why I Am Not a Panentheist

Michael Sudduth, a philosopher of religion at San Francisco State University, has caused quite a stir by announcing his departure from orthodox Christianity and conversion to Gaudiya Vaishnavism (a form of Vaishnava Vedanta Hinduism). Having known Michael for over a decade, and having had many profitable philosophical discussions with him, I was extremely grieved to read this announcement, although it didn’t come completely out of the blue. Some mutual friends had informed me of his increasing interest in Eastern religion and his gradually distancing himself from biblical Christianity. We had an email exchange last year when I raised some concerns (my last email, it turns out, was sent several days before his “profoundly moving religious experience of Krishna”) but it quickly fizzled out because Michael wasn’t ready at that time to set out his views in detail.

I’m not going to comment on his conversion testimony or on the complex personal experiences and circumstances that led to it (only some of which are mentioned in that testimony). However, I do want to remark on one particular statement:

Consequently, I now accept a panentheistic metaphysics in which the universe and human souls are, to put it roughly, in the being of God.

Christless Christianity: Dutch Style

H. Richard Niebuhr famously skewered the liberal Protestantism of his day with this distillation of its message:

A God without wrath brought men without sin into a kingdom without judgment through the ministrations of a Christ without a cross.

Seven decades later, some Dutch clergy are taking it to the next logical level: a God without existence brings men without beliefs into a kingdom without hope through the ministrations of a Christ without a life.

What would have functioned as a parody of liberalism a generation or two ago is now a tragic, pathetic reality. Abraham Kuyper must be spinning in his grave.

Thankfully there are still many thousands in the Netherlands who have not bowed the knee. Pray for them — and for revival in their homeland.

Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology

There’s considerable confusion today, even among Reformed Christians, about the implications of Reformed theology for human free will and moral responsibility. A large part of the problem is that often those who are well read in historical Reformed theology are not so well read in contemporary philosophy, and vice versa. Paul Manata is an exception and he has done us all a service by writing an excellent primer on the relationship between confessional Reformed theology and contemporary theories of human freedom and responsibility. Check it out and pass it on.

The Deliberate Protestant

A family friend asked me to comment on an article entitled “The Accidental Catholic”, which was recently posted on the Called to Communion blog (run by converts to Roman Catholicism from Reformed churches). Below are my comments (edited and slightly expanded).


The author’s basic argument can be summarized simply as follows:

  1. If Sola Scriptura were correct and the Protestant churches were led by the Holy Spirit, there wouldn’t be many doctrinal disagreements between Protestant churches.
  2. But there are many doctrinal disagreements between Protestant churches.
  3. Therefore, it can’t be the case that Sola Scriptura is correct and the Protestant churches are led by the Holy Spirit.

The most serious problem with the argument is that there’s no good reason to accept the first premise.  Here are some reasons why, along with some other related comments:

Comma Grace

If anyone tells you that careful punctuation doesn’t matter, just ask them whether it’s important to discern the difference between “Let’s eat, grandpa!” and “Let’s eat grandpa!” Hopefully they’ll see the point — so to speak.

Not only can a missing comma lead to familial strife, it can also screw up your theology. In the King James Version of the Bible, Luke 23:32 is translated as follows:

And there were also two other, malefactors, led with him to be put to death.

But in some early printings, so I’m told, the first of the two commas was inadvertently omitted:

And there were also two other malefactors, led with him to be put to death.

To think that the integrity of the atonement depended on a punctuation point!

A misplaced comma can do just as much theological damage as a missing one. At church last Sunday evening we sang the old hymn “Jesus Loves Me” from the Trinity Hymnal. The final stanza reads:

Jesus loves me, he will stay close beside me all the way;

If I love him, when I die he will take me home on high.

When sung to the traditional tune the rhythm of the melody is somewhat misleading, because the punctuation here is quite crucial. Here’s how it shouldn’t be written (and understood):

If I love him when I die, he will take me home on high.

A three-word shift in the comma makes an enormous soteriological difference! The entire doctrine of assurance is at stake in the correct placement of the punctuation mark.

Is this an instance of “comma grace”?

Geerhardus Vos’ Reformed Dogmatics

Most readers of this blog will know that I’m a big fan of the brilliant Reformed apologist Cornelius Van Til. (Proof: I drink coffee out of one of these.) Most readers of Van Til will know that he was a big fan of the brilliant Reformed biblical theologian Geerhardus Vos, who was one of his professors at Princeton Seminary. Van Til described Vos as “the greatest pedagogue I ever sat under.”

I’m not sure whether the big-fan-of relation is transitive, but it seems more than fitting to pass on word from Phil Gons that Logos are planning a full English translation of Vos’ Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. However, the project is contingent on there being sufficient interest. Go here for more information, including how to pre-order at a locked-in low price.