classical theism

Does God Break the Laws of Nature?

Back in 2021, the Carl F. H. Henry Center for Theological Understanding invited five scholars to write articles in answer to the question, “Does God break the laws of nature when he acts in the world?”

My contribution was entitled “An Invitation to Answer No,” and I gave three reasons for a negative answer:

  1. On a classical theistic view, God’s acts are the foundation for such laws and thus there can be no real conflict between divine acts and laws of nature.
  2. The laws of nature when properly qualified cannot be “broken” even by extraordinary divine acts.
  3. If we don’t think that human acts in the world break laws of nature, then we shouldn’t think that divine acts in the world do so.

Why is this important? Partly because one common objection to Christian theism is that supernatural divine acts (e.g., the parting of the Red Sea, the resurrection of Jesus) would involve God “breaking the laws of nature” and that would be, if not outright impossible, a Bad Thing. But more generally, it matters because the idea that God ‘breaks’ the laws of nature is often based on misunderstandings about (1) what laws of nature actually are and (2) God’s relationship to laws of nature.

If you read the whole thing, be sure to check out the contributions by the other four scholars (Peter Harrison, Barbara Drossel, Jeffrey Koperski, and Steven Horst) along with Hans Madueme’s introductory article.

John Frame Is Not a “Theistic Mutualist”

All That Is In GodIn his influential book, All That Is in God (Reformation Heritage Books, 2017), James Dolezal draws a sharp distinction between “classical Christian theism” and what he calls “theistic mutualism.” Dr. Dolezal criticizes a number of evangelical theologians, including some who identify with the Reformed tradition, for embracing theistic mutualism. One of his targets is John Frame. But is Dolezal right to categorize Frame as a theistic mutualist? I will argue here that this is a mistake. Dr. Frame, it turns out, is neither a “classical Christian theist” nor a “theistic mutualist” as Dolezal defines those terms.1

What is Theistic Mutualism?

In chapter 1 of his book, Dolezal defines and distinguishes two “distinctly different models” of Christian theism. The older of these two models is “classical Christian theism”:

It is marked by a strong commitment to the doctrines of divine aseity, immutability, impassibility, simplicity, eternity, and the substantial unity of the divine persons. The underlying and inviolable conviction is that God does not derive any aspect of His being from outside Himself and is not in any way caused to be. (p. 1)

Note the implication of the second sentence: presumably the other model will be such that God does derive some “aspect of His being from outside Himself” and is subject to external causation. In other words, the other model will be characterized by a denial of divine aseity.

The second model is “the newer approach of theistic mutualism” (p. 1). In a footnote, Dolezal clarifies what he means by ‘mutualism’:

“Mutualism,” as I am using the term, denotes a symbiotic relationship in which both parties derive something from each other. In such a relation, it is requisite that each party be capable of being ontologically moved or acted upon and thus determined by the other. This does not necessarily require parity between the parties involved. Accordingly, a mutualistic relation could obtain even if only one of the parties involved were the architect and ultimate regulator of the relation. (p. 1, fn. 1)

Dolezal further explains that according to theistic mutualists, “God is involved in a genuine give-and-take relationship with His creatures” (p. 2). Although some theistic mutualists identify with the Calvinist tradition, “many of them share with open and process theists the theistic mutualist belief that God’s being is such that He is capable of being moved by His creatures” (p. 3). This second model holds to “the newer ideal of a mutually interactive, give-and-take relationship with God” (p. 5). Theistic mutualists undermine divine perfection, Dolezal contends, because “God has been reconceived as deriving some aspects of His being in correlation with the world” (p. 6). While the “modern Calvinist theologians” who have embraced theistic mutualism explicitly reject open theism and process theism, they have arguably “already embraced a rudimentary form of process theism to the extent that they allow some measure of ontological becoming and dependency in God” (p. 7).

What’s very clear is that theistic mutualism, as Dolezal describes it, is characterized by a denial of God’s absolute independence. For the theistic mutualist, God is dependent on his creation, specifically in the sense that God is ‘moved’ by his creatures; that is to say, the creatures cause God to change.

  1. For Frame’s own response to Dolezal, see here.

A Christological Argument Against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

Many (not all) advocates of libertarian free will endorse the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP):

PAP: S is morally responsible for doing A only if S could have done otherwise.

PAP has come under continual fire ever since Harry Frankfurt’s seminal article in 1969, and many philosophers (including a number of leading libertarians) now accept that PAP is false. Leaving aside the philosophical arguments, however, it seems to me that any orthodox Christian ought to reject PAP on theological grounds.