Counter-apologist and valued commenter Ben Wallis has posted some criticisms of the argument for God from logic. (His post is basically a synthesis of the comments he posted here.) His approach is to attack the claim that if there are necessarily true propositions (i.e., necessary truths) then those propositions necessarily exist by appealing to the distinction between truth-in-w and truth-at-w (a distinction employed by Kit Fine and Robert Adams, albeit with different terminology). Drawing on this distinction, Ben proposes a view of propositions according to which necessary truths exist contingently. In this follow-up post, I explain why I believe Ben’s proposal isn’t viable.
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