How Could a Loving God Send Anyone to Hell?

If the problem of evil and suffering is the greatest challenge to the Christian faith, as many people think, then arguably the problem of hell is the most acute form of it. It’s one thing to believe that God permits suffering for a greater good purpose, and that the people of God will be decisively delivered from all suffering in the end (Rev. 21:3-4). It’s another thing to believe that those who are not reconciled to God will suffer eternal punishment for their sins (Rev. 14:9-11; 20:13-15). This is not a happy doctrine, to say the least, but it’s one that historically most Christians have taken to be the clear teaching of Christ and his apostles.

How Could a Loving God Send Anyone to Hell?How could a loving God send anyone to hell? How do we reconcile the goodness and mercy of God with the doctrine of eternal punishment? How could Jesus Christ, the paragon of compassion and virtue, countenance such a seemingly dark doctrine? These are fair questions. Indeed, they are hard but unavoidable questions for thoughtful Christians, not to mention for critics and skeptics.

There are no easy, simple, or comfortable answers. But there are answers, and we don’t have to engage in wild speculation to find them, because the key elements of those answers are provided in the same Bible from which the ‘problematic’ doctrine comes. In the fourth book in The Big Ten series, pastor and scholar Benjamin Skaug lays out those answers with candor and compassion, explaining and defending the doctrine of hell in the broader context of the teachings of Jesus, the apostles, and the Bible as a whole. In short, the doctrine of hell only makes moral and theological sense within the wider framework of the biblical storyline and worldview. No Christian doctrine stands alone; each theological ‘part’ must be interpreted in light of the whole. Ultimately, the darkness of hell only accentuates the brightness of the gospel: the good news of salvation by God’s free grace through Jesus Christ.

Here are two of the endorsements for the book:

You can tell a lot about a church based upon what is preached from the pulpit—and what isn’t. Thus, to survey the landscape of contemporary evangelicalism, it would be easy to conclude that few, if any, churches believe in a literal hell. Of course, the Scriptures as a whole, and our Lord Jesus Christ in particular, present an altogether different picture. Thankfully, Ben Skaug presents a compelling and biblical case for a literal hell and how it is rooted in the character of God. As believers in Christ, we don’t fear an eternity in hell, but the reality of it should motivate us to greater evangelistic witness. How Could a Loving God Send Anyone to Hell? provides just such motivation for the reader. — Jason K. Allen, President, Midwestern Baptist Theological Seminary

Hell is often misunderstood or rejected outright today. Ben Skaug helps us see that the doctrine of hell fits with what the Bible teaches about who God is, with the teaching of Jesus, and with the nature of human beings. Indeed, the message of the gospel doesn’t make sense without the doctrine of hell. Here is a book on hell that needs to be read, digested, believed, and acted upon. — Thomas R. Schreiner, James Buchanan Harrison Professor of New Testament Interpretation and Associate Dean, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Kentucky

Here’s the table of contents:

  • Introduction
  • 1 Who Can Judge the World?
  • 2 How Can a Loving God Send Anyone to Hell?
  • 3 What Does the Loving Jesus Teach about Hell?
  • 4 What Did the Loving Apostles Teach About Hell?
  • 5 How Can Hell Be Avoided?
  • 6 Is Hell Eternal?
  • 7 Is Hell Emptied?
  • 8 Conclusion
  • Appendix: Frequently Asked Questions

The appendix addresses the following questions:

  • “Is hell real?”
  • “Does Satan rule hell?”
  • “Are the images of hell found in the Bible literal or figurative?”
  • “Why is hell eternal when it seems that human sins are finite and limited?”
  • “If hell is so awful, and God wants to save people, then why does God not allow people to repent in hell?”
  • “If hell is so awful, and God does not want people to end up there, then why does He not provide more warning about it?”
  • “How can the saved be eternally happy knowing that some of their loved ones are in hell?”

If you know someone who is wrestling with questions about the Bible’s teaching about hell, or if you’re grappling with such questions yourself, I think you’ll find this book to be helpful and hopeful resource.

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Update on The Big Ten Series

I’ve been embarrassingly delinquent in keeping readers updated on the progress of The Big Ten series, which I’ve been co-editing with Greg Welty for Christian Focus. Five more volumes have been published since I last posted about it, and I will endeavor to post a brief summary of each one over the next couple of months.

In the meantime, here’s the list of all eight published volumes:

The final two entries in the series are in the pipeline. Working titles:

  • Why Do I Personally Experience Evil and Suffering?
  • Is There Really Only One Way to God?

It’s taken some time, but I’m really pleased with the way the series has developed and I’m very proud (in a brotherly, non-bragging kind of way) of the volumes published to date. If you’re not familiar with the series, please check it out. It’s a great resource for both skeptical unbelievers and questioning believers.

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A Four-Case Defense of the Authorial Model of Divine Providence

I’m pleased to report that my paper “A Four-Case Defense of the Authorial Model of Divine Providence” has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Analytic Theology.

Abstract: Some advocates of the doctrine of meticulous (“risk-free”) divine providence, in response to the charge that such a strong view of divine providence makes God the “author of evil,” have appealed to an authorial model according to which the relationship of God to his creation is analogous to that of a human author and his or her literary creation. This response appears vulnerable to the objection that there is a critical disanalogy between the two kinds of authorship: in the case of divine authorship, unlike that of human authorship, the story is intentionally actualized, and thus the divine author is morally culpable for the evils written into that story. Call this the “actuality objection.” In this paper, I develop a four-case defense of the authorial model that aims to neutralize the actuality objection. I also respond to five objections to the authorial model and my defense of it.

A preprint version is available here.

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An Epistemological Argument Against Naturalism

Consider the following epistemological argument against Naturalism (as defined below):

  1. If Naturalism is true, then all factual knowledge (i.e., knowledge of facts) is acquired empirically.
  2. Knowledge of necessary facts cannot be acquired empirically.
  3. We have some knowledge of necessary facts.
  4. Therefore, Naturalism is not true.

The insights behind the argument aren’t original to me, but the formulation is mine. Before I defend the three premises, let me clarify the key terms used in the argument.

Naturalism refers to the ontological thesis that only natural things exist, that is, things that exist spatiotemporally and can be described according to our best physical theories. On this definition, Naturalism is roughly equivalent to physicalism, the view that the fundamental ‘stuff’ of reality is physical and whatever exists can be accounted for (in principle) in terms of physical reality (physical particles, physical forces, etc.).1

Factual knowledge refers to knowledge of facts about the world; specifically, facts about an external world that exists independently of our minds. Factual knowledge is distinct from (1) analytical knowledge (i.e., knowledge of logical or conceptual truths, such as that a triangle is a polygon) and (2) knowledge of internal mental states (e.g., that I am currently experiencing pain). A simple example of factual knowledge would be that there are, at this present moment, more than two turtles in Turtle Pond.

Empirically means by way of sense experience or observation, that is, by means of our sensory organs (the standard five senses or any others we might have that operate on a similar basis).

Necessary facts are facts about what must be the case, as opposed to what merely is the case or could be the case. To know a necessary fact is to know not merely that something actually is the case, but also that it could not possibly have failed to be the case. Knowledge of necessary facts is a species of factual knowledge (as defined above).

Now, back to the argument. I think it’s fairly clear that the argument is logically valid: the conclusion follows from the three premises. If premises 2 and 3 are true, it follows that some factual knowledge is not acquired empirically, in which case — by modus tollens from premise 1 — Naturalism is not true.

So why think that the premises are true? Consider each in turn.

  1. The physicalism could be reductive or non-reductive; I don’t think it makes a difference to the argument. Some self-professed naturalists hold to a more liberal ontology, e.g., allowing for sets or abstract mathematical objects. Whether those more liberal versions of naturalism are vulnerable to this argument is an open question that I won’t address here.

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The Best Defenders and Defenses of Atheism?

Who are the best defenders of atheism? Where can one find the strongest defenses of atheism?

I get asked those questions from time to time, and they’re good questions, so I’m going to offer my own answers (for what they’re worth) in this post.

First, however, a few observations and caveats. For the last couple of decades, Christian apologists have tended to focus on the so-called New Atheists, most notably the “Four Horsemen” of Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, and Daniel Dennett. There’s good sense in that. Among proponents of atheism, those writers receive the most attention from the public and media, whether or not they deserve it. They’re the loudest, most entertaining, most provocative, and most influential voices for the atheist cause in the public square. They’ve had a significant impact in promoting anti-religious skepticism and turning people away from Christianity. I continue to hear stories of ‘ex-Christians’ who say that reading The God Delusion or God Is Not Great shook their faith “to the core” and eventually destroyed it. I’m always taken aback by such reports, because I’ve read those books too, and there’s precious little in the way of serious and substantive argument in them. (Dennett is the most intellectually serious of the Four Horsemen, but he doesn’t so much argue for atheism as just take it for granted.)

But here’s the thing: the New Atheists are hardly the best and the brightest of contemporary atheists (despite Dennett’s unironic attempt to self-advertise as “the brights”). Their criticisms of religious beliefs do need to be refuted, of course, but as I’ve said before, that’s low-hanging fruit. The most sophisticated and formidable arguments in defense of atheism, and specifically for naturalism, come from academic philosophers, particularly those who specialize in philosophy of religion. They’re trained in logic and critical thinking. They’ve studied the scholarly literature. They’re well-versed in the arguments for and against the existence of God, both classical and contemporary. They actually know what they’re talking about.

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Did Cornelius Van Til Coin the Term “Transcendental Argument”?

A transcendental argument, simply defined, is an argument purporting to demonstrate that some X (such as a particular concept, belief, or state of affairs) is a necessary precondition of some undeniable feature of human cognition (e.g., that we have orderly experiences or make judgments). At least, that is the conventional understanding of the term today. But who was the first to use the term in that sense?

Surprisingly, it might have been Cornelius Van Til.

I’m currently working on a monograph on Van Til’s transcendental argument for God (more precisely, for Christian theism). Preparatory research has required me to review everything Van Til says, explicitly or implicitly, about transcendental argumentation across his corpus, and to take a deep dive into the contemporary literature on transcendental arguments. In the process, I discovered something quite interesting.

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Suggested Readings on Epistemology

I was recently asked to suggest reading lists on (1) epistemology in general, (2) religious epistemology, and (3) Reformed presuppositional/Van Tilian/Framean epistemology. Here’s my response, in case it’s useful for other folk. Obviously these are just start-up lists, and there may be better introductory texts/articles that I haven’t come across. (Registered users, feel free to make further recommendations in the comments.)


I think the following books should get you up to speed on contemporary epistemology in general (and religious epistemology more specifically):

  • Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed.)
  • Ernest Sosa et al, eds., Epistemology: An Anthology (2nd ed.)
  • Matthias Steup et al, eds., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed.)
  • William Alston, Perceiving God
  • Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, Warrant and Proper Function, and Warranted Christian Belief
  • Richard Swinburne, Epistemic Justification
  • John M. DePoe & Tyler McNabb, eds., Debating Christian Religious Epistemology

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has many helpful articles on topics in epistemology, but start with these:

Kelly James Clark’s article “Religious Epistemology” in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides a good overview of the contemporary landscape (along with a helpful bibliography).

On Reformed presuppositional/Van Tilian/Framean epistemology, I recommend the following for starters:

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Van Til & the Use of Evidence

Van Til & the Use of EvidenceThom Notaro’s excellent little book, Van Til & the Use of Evidence, has been out of print for years. However, Thom holds the copyright and has generously granted permission for me to make a scanned copy of the book available for free download. Enjoy!

Van Til & the Use of Evidence (with cover) (3.5 MB)

Van Til & the Use of Evidence (without cover) (3.2 MB)

The advantage of the “without cover” version (other than the smaller size) is that the PDF page numbers correspond exactly to the book page numbers.

Both versions are searchable (big thanks to Fred Zaspel and Michael Riley).

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Van Til and Analytic Philosophy

An essay written for a forthcoming collection of essays “in the Van Til tradition.”

The main thesis: While Van Til was rightly critical of the early forms of analytic philosophy (Moore, Russell, etc.), there is no inherent conflict between Van Tilian philosophy and contemporary analytic philosophy; in fact, there are significant points of affinity or complementarity. Thus, “analytic Van Tilianism” is not a contradiction in terms, but rather a project worth pursuing.

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A Muslim Defends His Worldview

What's Your Worldview?I was gratified to receive the following message via the Contact form:

Sir, I’m a Muslim, and I’ve read the Islam section in your book What’s Your Worldview. However, to say the least, I haven’t found any of the objections therein to be tenable:

He goes on to give brief responses to two of the “objections” I raised. (In the book, I really presented them only as food for thought, as prompts for readers to think more critically about the Islamic worldview. But still, it’s fair to call them objections.) In this post, I’ll reproduce the relevant sections from What’s Your Worldview? along with his responses, and then reply to them. (In the quotations from WYW, I’ve omitted the endnotes, most of which provide references to verses in the Quran.)

Objection #1

From WYW, pp. 65-66:

One of the central teachings of Islam is that there will be a final day of judgment. On that day, all of our words and deeds will be weighed in the balance of divine justice. Those who have believed in Allah and lived good enough lives will be rewarded with pleasures in paradise, while the rest will be punished with torments in hell.

Muslims don’t think that you have to live an absolutely perfect life to enter paradise. They insist that Allah is compassionate and merciful, and can forgive the sins of those who believe in him and love him (though no one should ever presume upon Allah’s forgiveness). However, there seems to be a tension within Islam between the justice and the mercy of Allah. If justice is to be satisfied, every violation of the law should receive its just penalty. Therefore, an absolutely perfect judge would ensure that no crime goes unpunished. According to Islam, however, Allah simply chooses to overlook some people’s sins. How, then, can he be an absolutely perfect judge? Does Allah consistently uphold his own just laws? The problem for Islam is that, unlike Christianity, it has no doctrine of atonement that could explain how God could forgive human sins without violating his own principles of justice.

Our Muslim friend responds:

1. “First, anyone who acts unjustly towards any person or being would fall short of being perfectly good. So, if there are cases in which God needs to prioritize being just over being, say, forgiving, God’s perfect goodness requires him to do what is just in that case. Second, justice reflects the balance and harmony between God’s moral attributes. Hence, the cases in which God deems it more appropriate to be forgiving over treating people as they deserve, He concedes justice and acts mercifully. However, in those cases, justice is at work in a different way, as God judges it to be more harmonious or appropriate to be forgiving over doing what justice––in its first sense––requires to do.” – Seyma Yazici: Is God perfectly good in Islam?

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