Second Reply: Some Comments
(Aquascum, aquascumSPAMMENOT at gmail dot com)
Table of Contents:
On defeating empirical sources of knowledge
For the benefit of my readers, I here summarize Vincent Cheung’s second reply to me, and my response. Cheung essentially claims three things:
[VC1] I ‘beg the question’ against him because I assume that Scripturalism is false because it is not true.
[VC2] I claim that Scripturalism cannot be deduced from Scripture, when it is easy to provide such a deduction, indeed in a single paragraph.
[VC3] Empiricism can be easily defeated, even in its allegedly ‘biblical’ versions, and it certainly cannot be used to defeat Cheung’s ‘anti-empiricism’.
In reply, I say:
[AS1] I have never assumed that Scripturalism is false. Rather, what I argue is that whether Scripturalism is true or false, it is unknowable and is unjustified opinion at best. This follows not from the assumption that Scripturalism is false, but simply from the content of the Scripturalist claim about knowledge
[AS2] Cheung’s attempt to validly deduce Scripturalism from Scripture is a miserable failure, crucially relying as it does on a non-revelational epistemological principle (infallibilism about knowledge).
[AS3] Cheung’s analysis of empiricism relies on not one but two non-revelational epistemological principles (infallibilism and internalism), thus revealing the radical incoherence of Cheung’s ‘Scripturalist package’ as a foundation for apologetics.
In his blog entry, “‘Biblical’ Empiricism Incoherent” (cf. <http://www.vincentcheung.com/2005/07/07/biblical-empiricism-incoherent/>), Vincent Cheung has provided yet another response, of sorts, to my original Response to his apologetic method. What’s striking about this current effort is that in a mere three paragraphs Cheung manages to completely miss just about every point I raised re: the ‘Scripturalist package’ of Scripturalism, infallibilism, internalism, and occasionalism.
Cheung’s first two paragraphs read:
One argument alleges that Scripturalism is incoherent because the proposition, “All knowledge comes from biblical propositions and their necessary implications” is not itself a biblical proposition, and that it cannot be deduced from biblical propositions; therefore, if one accepts Scripturalism, one should reject Scripturalism.
However, this argument begs the question. In effect, it is just saying that Scripturalism is false because it is not true, but it says this without showing that it is not true.
What Cheung says here bears a certain similarity to something that George Macleod Coghill has recently argued on the all-bahnsen list. And that is, technically speaking, something like:
[1] Scripturalism is true
is not ‘self-referentially incoherent’ all by itself, such that if it were true, we would have a good reason to reject it as false. However, the following theses are self-referentially incoherent:
[2] Scripturalism is known to be true
[3] Scripturalism is not unjustified opinion
And, indeed, something like [2] and [3] were the broader theses I was targeting (that is, Scripturalism as situated within Cheung’s broader appraisal of it). After all, plainly Cheung does regard Scripturalism as something known by many people, and certainly not unjustified opinion! Indeed, as I documented from “Ultimate Questions” (p. 43) he thinks he has validly deduced “biblical epistemology” (i.e., Scripturalism) from “biblical metaphysics” (divine sovereignty). On Cheung’s view, all valid deductions from Scripture constitute knowledge (in the sense of knowable propositions). Therefore, since Cheung holds that he has validly deduced Scripturalism from Scripture, Cheung holds that Scripturalism is knowable, and not merely unjustified opinion at best.
Clearly then, if my critique is correct, the Scripturalist is in the fairly ludicrous position of having to hold that no one can know that Scripturalism is true. Indeed, no one knows the truth of Scripturalism. Indeed, it follows that Scripturalism is unjustified opinion. If Cheung thinks that the preceding three conclusions do not follow from my critique, now would be the time to make this clear and why.
So, my main claim here is not that Scripturalism rules
itself out as false, but that it rules itself out as unknowable and
unjustifiable opinion. The latter two appraisals of Scripturalism follow
quite clearly from my critique, and are in directly conflict with Cheung’s own
appraisal of Scripturalism. Scripturalism proposes a definition of knowledge
that rules itself out as unknowable. If it were true, no one
could ever know this. I take it that Cheung would agree with me that presenting
an epistemology to the world that is both unknowable and unjustified opinion
would be an utter embarrassment for the advocate of that epistemology. But
unfortunately, Scripturalism has as much positive epistemic status as “my pink
unicorn loves me” or “Rocky Road is the best ice cream flavor in the world.” It
is as worthy of my assent as “the moon is made of green cheese.” Is this
damaging to the Scripturalist position? Let’s take a survey and find out! ;-)
Broadly speaking, then, the position that I regard as self-referentially incoherent is the claim that anyone knows Scripturalism, or that Scripturalism is something other than unjustified opinion. That is, we have every reason to believe that even if Scripturalism is true, it is unjustified opinion and not knowable.
Now, Cheung says that “this argument begs the question” because “it is just saying that Scripturalism is false because it is not true, but it says this without showing that it is not true.” But that’s not the case at all. I don’t assume that Scripturalism is false. Rather, I assume (for the sake of argument) that it is true, and then I ask what would be the case if Scripturalism were true? Well, since Scripturalism is neither a proposition of Scripture or validly deducible from propositions of Scripture, then if Scripturalism were true we couldn’t know it was true. In addition, since Scripturalism divides up all propositions whatsoever into either knowledge or “unjustified opinion at best” (to use Cheung’s terminology), then since Scripturalism isn’t knowledge (not being validly deducible from Scripture) it must be unjustified opinion at best. And, of course, these conclusions also follow if Scripturalism is false. Thus, whether Scripturalism is true or false, it isn’t knowable and is unjustified opinion at best. I challenge Cheung to show us where this argument assumes that Scripturalism is false. It doesn’t. Nor does my argument ask Scripturalists to prove that Scripturalism is true. Rather, my argument points out some devastating epistemological consequences if Scripturalism were true. Not much prospect for begging the question here.
God help us all if “the first principle of the Christian worldview” (Cheung’s description of Scripturalism) is unjustified opinion at best. What an embarrassing foundation for apologetic endeavor.
Cheung’s third paragraph reads:
But the principle can be deduced from Scripture. The Bible teaches that God is infallible, that the Bible is his infallible revelation, that God controls all things, that man is fallible, that man’s sensations and intuitions are fallible, etc., etc. — put them together, and BAM, you have Scripturalism.
I really hope that Cheung’s readers carefully read the above paragraph and reflect upon it in light of what is really required for a valid deduction of the proposition “All knowledge comes from biblical propositions and their necessary implications.” How does it follow from the above paragraph that all knowledge is restricted to propositions of Scripture or valid deductions from propositions of Scripture? As I pointed out in my original response, Scripturalism is not merely the thesis that knowledge consists of propositions of Scripture (i.e., SS1) and of valid deductions from propositions of Scripture (i.e., SS2). In addition, a key, constitutive claim of Scripturalism is that all other propositions are unjustified opinion at best (i.e., SEP). Now, where in the above paragraph does Cheung ‘deduce’ from Scripture in any way that all knowledge is restricted to Scripture and valid deductions therefrom?
What’s remarkable here is that Cheung makes the same mistake that he made in his first reply to me (cf. my “First Reply: Some Comments,” on this webpage). He rehearses for us his belief in SS1 and SS2, but completely misses the fact that SEP is a constitutive element of Scripturalism as well (and is indeed the most controversial aspect of it).
Perhaps Cheung thinks that because “man’s sensations and intuitions are fallible,” that therefore it follows that no proposition neither contained in nor validly deducible from Scripture can constitute knowledge. But of course that inference assumes the infallibilist constraint on knowledge, and Cheung nowhere gives a cogent argument for that from Scripture! In other words, his attempted deduction of Scripturalism from Scripture (in particular, his attempted deduction of SEP from Scripture) crucially relies on a non-revelational epistemological principle, a proposition neither found in nor implied by Scriptural propositions. Indeed, the infallibilist constraint on knowledge is an intuition about knowledge at best, but since Cheung is already on record as holding that man’s intuitions are fallible, he certainly cannot appeal to that. In addition, since “man’s sensations and intuitions” are simply occasions upon which God produces beliefs in us (by divine illumination, a la Cheung’s occasionalism), then since “man’s sensations and intuitions are fallible,” it follows that the process of divine illumination is fallible, and therefore cannot give us knowledge. All of these arguments were given at greater length in the original Response, of course.
So Cheung’s ‘deduction’ of Scripturalism from Scripture is a miserable failure. Indeed, I would argue that he can’t even deduce SS2 from Scripture, much less SEP (cf. my original Response, where I argue this). In addition, by affirming the fallibility of sensation and intuition, Cheung acknowledges that God often produces in us false beliefs, which means that the process of divine illumination is fallible. But then, given Cheung’s infallibilist constraint on knowledge, this means that divine illumination cannot give us knowledge.
I withhold extended comment on Cheung’s subsequent paragraphs, which are all about how empiricism and science cannot get us knowledge. The reason I withhold comment is because Cheung’s entire discussion simply assumes the infallibilist constraint on knowledge. Since this constraint is not validly deducible from Scripture, by relying on this constraint Cheung must acknowledge that he relies on “unjustified opinion at best” in defeating empiricism as a source of knowledge. In addition he has given himself a reason to reject Scripturalism, for if the infallibilist constraint is known by Cheung, then Scripturalism has incorrectly defined ‘knowledge’.
Cheung also relies on the internalist constraint on knowledge throughout his critique of empiricism and ‘biblical’ empiricism. But it really would be tedious to repeat those arguments all over again. The reader should simply ask himself, “Why does Cheung keep on insisting that I have to know how I know p, or that I know p, in order to know p, when Cheung still hasn’t bothered to deduce that constraint on knowledge from the Scriptures themselves? Why is Cheung still making generous use of non-revelational epistemological principles in an attempt to defend the rejection of all such principles? That is, why is Cheung still posting radically incoherent defenses to his blog, even when this has been pointed out to him at length?”
It boggles the mind. It really does. But to each his own, I guess J
-- Aquascum