Commentary on Manata
(Aquascum, aquascumSPAMMENOT at gmail dot com)
Paul Manata has recently blogged a post entitled “Cheung, Knowledge, and Occasionalism,” at <http://presstheantithesis.blogspot.com/2005/06/cheung-knowledge-and-occasionalism.html>. I highly recommend it, as it’s full of insight. I want to offer some commentary on some passages, primarily as a means of expanding on some of his excellent points. I also offer some potential replies Cheung could give to Manata’s reasoning, but in the end, these replies won’t get him very far.
Defining Knowledge
Manata’s piece largely revolves around Cheung’s claim that “Science cannot yield any knowledge.” In response to this claim, Manata asked Cheung for his understanding of ‘knowledge’. And in response to that innocent-sounding request, Cheung says:
But if the challenge is to define “knowledge” in a proposition such as, “Science cannot yield any knowledge,” then let our opponents first define “science,” and then logically demonstrate how it can validly reach any conclusion about anything, and then we can proceed to examine our denial.
Now this is peculiar. Cheung makes a claim, but in response to a request to explain one of the terms Cheung used in his own claim, Cheung says, no, he won’t do that until the one who asks him a question first defines one of the other terms in Cheung’s claim! Surely this will get nowhere fast. Why must the one who asks questions about Cheung’s terms first define Cheung’s other terms for him? It’s as if I said, “Poodles can produce no Jabberwocks,” and in response to a question about what I mean by ‘Jabberwock,’ I say, “No, I’m not saying anything until you first tell me what I mean by ‘poodle’.” This is not a dialogue calculated to enlighten.
BTW, while we’re on the subject of the ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ phenomenon, there’s a striking passage in Cheung’s “Systematic Theology”:
Therefore, every worldview requires a first principle or ultimate authority. Being first or ultimate, such a principle cannot be justified by any prior or greater authority; otherwise, it would not be the first or ultimate. The first principle must then possess the content to justify itself. For example, the proposition, “All knowledge comes from sense experience,” fails to be a first principle on which a worldview can be constructed, since if all knowledge comes from sense experience, this proposed principle must also be known only by sense experience, but prior to proving the principle, the reliability of sense experience has not yet been established. Thus, the principle results in a vicious circle, and self-destructs. It matters not what may be validly deduced from such a principle – if the system cannot even begin, what follows from the principle cannot be accepted. (“Systematic Theology,” p. 37 para. 2)
Let’s first examine Cheung’s reasoning, and then see whether he would accept it against his own “first principle” (Scripturalism). According to Cheung, the following proposition “fails to be a first principle on which a worldview can be constructed”:
[1] “All knowledge comes from sense experience.”
Why does [1] fail to be a first principle on which a worldview can be constructed? Well, according to Cheung, if [1] is true, then [1] must be known only by sense experience, but prior to proving [1], “the reliability of sense experience has not yet been established. Thus, the principle results in a vicious circle, and self-destructs.”
Now, why in the world the advocate of [1] must prove [1], much less prove [1] apart from reliance on [1], when [1] is supposed to be a first principle of a worldview, is anyone’s guess. This is called, “Heads I win, tails you lose.”
If the above doesn’t convince Cheung that something is awry, perhaps the following will. Let’s see if Cheung’s own worldview survives this kind of reasoning. Consider the following, which is simply a statement of Cheung’s Scripturalism:
[2] All knowledge is either of propositions of Scripture or of propositions validly deducible from propositions of Scripture.
Surely, if [2] is true, then it can only be known if it is either a proposition of Scripture or a proposition validly deducible from propositions of Scripture. But prior to proving [2], we haven’t established that knowledge is either of propositions of Scripture or of propositions validly deducible from propositions of Scripture. Thus, [2] results in a vicious circle, and self-destructs. (Or, so says Cheung’s reasoning above, applied to [2].)
But perhaps a divine illumination theory will help here, and can successfully play the role of “first principle of a worldview” where Scripturalism (i.e., [2]) failed. Let’s see. Consider:
[3] All knowledge is by divine illumination, in which God causes our true beliefs without mediation.
Could [3] be a first principle on which a worldview can be constructed? Well, let’s see. If [3] is true, then [3] must be known only by divine illumination. But prior to proving [3], the reliability of divine illumination has not yet been established. Thus, [3] results in a vicious circle, and self-destructs.
Indeed, what Cheung’s reasoning shows is not that empiricism isn’t a viable first principle, but that there couldn’t be such a thing as a viable first principle. You can’t call something a “first principle” and demand that you prove it without relying upon it. If you could, it wouldn’t be a “first principle,” would it? Cheung’s reasoning, if sound, would give him a reason to reject his own worldview. This is just one more piece of evidence that Cheung’s works are riddled through and through with self-referential incoherence.
Notice that Cheung’s specious reasoning above is quite different from the reasoning I’ve used repeatedly (in other documents posted to this webpage) to show that Scripturalism is self-referentially incoherent. I haven’t asked that the advocate of Scripturalism prove Scripturalism without relying upon Scripturalism (just like, say, Cheung has asked the advocate of empiricism to prove empiricism without relying upon empiricism). Indeed, I haven’t asked for a proof of Scripturalism at all. Rather, my argument is that if Scripturalism were true, we would have a good reason to reject it, because Scripturalism doesn’t satisfy its own claims about knowledge. It is neither a proposition of Scripture nor validly deducible from propositions of Scripture. The point is not that Scripturalism is unproven, but that it is self-referentially incoherent. If it were true, then we couldn’t know it was true.
Deduction and Occasionalism
Manata points out that, on the one hand, Cheung says all knowledge is conveyed to the human mind by God without mediation, but on the other hand, Cheung says that knowledge includes that which is deducible from Scripture. Manata asks:
But if I could obtain knowledge by deducing a conclusion from scriptural premises then did I not go through a process? My mind reasoned from P to Q then concluded P. If I can obtain knowledge by the process of inference then it is false that all knowledge is given immediately by God, without it being mediated.
I see where Manata is going with this criticism, but actually there are a few things Cheung could say in response. First, he could say that the process of deduction provides the occasion for God to immediately produce a belief in our minds. The process itself didn’t cause the belief, even as (for Cheung) sense experience doesn’t cause our beliefs. Rather, any observations we have or reasonings we conduct in this life only provide an occasion for God to immediately produce various beliefs in our mind.
Second, strictly speaking Cheung did not say that we gain knowledge by deducing conclusions from Scripture. Rather, he simply said that knowledge consists, in part, of propositions deducible from Scripture. No one in fact has to perform the deduction. All that matters is that the proposition believed is deducible from Scripture, not that anyone in particular performs the deduction, much less that the deduction caused our belief in the proposition deduced. In his (partial) definition of knowledge, Cheung is not talking about a process of deduction we subjectively go through, but rather an objective status which particular propositions have: the status of being deducible from propositions of Scripture. As long as God puts beliefs in those propositions in our minds, all is well.
Nevertheless, these possible replies are cold comfort for Cheung. There are plenty of reasons to reject Cheung’s version of occasionalism, and his Scripturalism, as I tried to make plain in my original Response.
Infallibility and Occasionalism
Manata points out Cheung’s claim that “God causes people to believe lies as he wishes (and as Scripture teaches),” and points out that the only positive Scriptural foundation for this are texts which speak of God deceiving unbelievers. Manata rightly points out that Cheung has no Scriptural text which teaches that God also deceives believers. This is true, but Cheung has another card up his sleeve. Cheung’s real argument for the view that believers are regularly deceived by God is not an appeal to a single text of Scripture, but is rather a deduction from the biblical doctrine of divine sovereignty. According to Cheung, because God is sovereign he is the only cause in the universe. Therefore, he is the cause of all beliefs whatsoever, and a fortiori the cause of all false beliefs whatsoever. Thus, to the extent that believers have false beliefs (and surely, we have plenty over the course of our lives), those beliefs have been caused by God. On Cheung’s view, he doesn’t need a Bible verse which explicitly says that God deceives believers. All he needs is a robust doctrine of divine sovereignty, and he can deduce his conclusion from that.
Of course, the notion that Cheung’s version of occasionalism, wherein God is the only cause in the universe, is a valid deduction from the doctrine of divine sovereignty (what Cheung calls “biblical metaphysics”) is totally bogus. I subjected his reasoning on this point to a series of criticisms in section 4.2 of my Response. The idea that God is the only cause in the universe is easily refuted by many texts of Scripture.
Manata then wonders if Cheung can avoid skepticism about Cheung’s own knowledge claims, once Cheung accepts that God regularly deceives believers. For perhaps God is deceiving Cheung right now, as he writes his apologetics books, even as God has (on Cheung’s hypothesis) deceived countless believers in the past. This is a very good question, and goes to the heart of why Cheung’s occasionalism undermines, at the very least, the infallibilist constraint on knowledge to which Cheung regularly appeals.
Cheung could have a reply here. He could say, “Well, I can’t know that I’m not being deceived, but that doesn’t matter. As long as my beliefs in fact are true (whether I know this or not), and as long as my beliefs in fact are beliefs in propositions either contained in Scripture or validly deducible from Scripture (whether I know this or not), then my beliefs constitute knowledge.” Notice that if this is indeed Cheung’s reply, then he must give up his internalist constraint on knowledge. He can no longer insist that someone must know that he knows p, in order to know p. But if he gave up the internalist constraint on knowledge, Cheung would lose a primary weapon in his apologetic arsenal against unbelievers. For Cheung regularly claims that unbelievers can’t know p if they don’t know how or that they know p.
Beyond the above reply (in which Cheung must pay far too high a price), I don’t know how Cheung would answer Manata’s repeated argument that divine illumination is a very fallible process indeed, since God produces billions of false beliefs in his human creatures every day, including Christians. It looks like Cheung can have his infallibilist constraint on knowledge, or he can have his version of occasionalism, but he cannot consistently have both. Each thesis gives him a reason to reject the other.
Manata concludes:
Well, I have nowhere seen in his books or blog entries his answer to the problem he brought upon himself, that is, How does Cheung know that God is not deceiving Vincent Cheung when Cheung has stated that God regularly and systematically deceives all people on a daily basis?
I maintain that Cheung's occasionalism reduces to a radical skepticism.
Yes, that sounds about right! As long as Cheung believes infallibility is required for knowledge, then Cheung’s occasionalism can’t give him knowledge at all. Cheung has refuted Christianity as a means of defending Christianity. Whereas Kant said, “I had to destroy reason in order to make room for faith,” the moral of this story is that Cheung had to refute Christianity in order to make room for apologetics.
-- Aquascum