First Reply: Some Comments
(Aquascum, aquascumSPAMMENOT at gmail dot com)
Table of Contents:
Summary
Introduction
My claims about Scripturalism
Knowledge vs. opinion
Innate knowledge and Ro 1-2
Criticism and epistemology
Summary
For the benefit of my readers, I can summarize in three sentences Vincent Cheung’s first reply to me, and then summarize my response in three sentences. Cheung essentially claims three things:
[VC1] He makes a distinction between knowledge and opinion.
[VC2] He thinks he can provide a deductively valid argument for one of his key claims about Ro 1-2.
[VC3] He thinks I must have an entire epistemology, and have justified my criticisms in light of that epistemology, before I can offer any cogent criticisms of him.
In reply, I say:
[AS1] The Scripturalist distinction between knowledge and opinion, far from undermining any of my criticisms of Cheung, was in fact appealed to in those criticisms, making Cheung’s highlighting this distinction of doubtful relevance to anything I’ve said.
[AS2] Not only is Cheung’s argument from Ro 1-2 nowhere close to a valid deduction from Scripture alone (employing as it does non-Scriptural premises about “systems of thought”), but it implicitly denies a central teaching of Ro 1-2.
[AS3] Since my reductio ad absurdum exclusively appeals to Cheung’s premises, rather than to any of my own, I have no need whatsoever to justify the premises of my arguments against him; for Cheung to think otherwise is either because he has fallen back on his discredited epistemological internalism (and thus continues to employ an assumption inconsistent with his Scripturalism), or because, in rejecting my appeal to his premises, he ipso facto rejects his own epistemology as unjustified to begin with.
Before I get into the details, I just want to pose one simple question for Cheung, out of all of the questions I’ve posed for him so far. Where does Scripture either say or imply that all knowledge is restricted to either propositions of Scripture or valid deductions from propositions of Scripture? This is a simple question; it should admit of a simple answer. If not even Cheung can answer this one, then I think I can’t be blamed for continuing to hold that Scripturalism is self-referentially incoherent, because it doesn’t pass its own standards for knowledge.
Introduction
In his blog entry, “Fallacies, and Fallacies upon Fallacies” (cf. <http://www.vincentcheung.com/2005/07/02/fallacies-and-fallacies-upon-fallacies/>), Vincent Cheung has provided a response, of sorts, to my original Response to his apologetic method. Sharp readers will have noticed that the “Mucsauqa” to which he cleverly refers is none other than your humble “Aquascum”.
Cheung’s response is notable in that it is long on claim but short on argument. Indeed, the roughly three arguments it attempts are not only wholly unsound, but in addition provide even more reason to regard Cheung’s views as self-referentially incoherent. Let’s take a look at Cheung’s reply.
Cheung cites an email from a reader who says:
From what I can tell Mucsauqa and others fail to note what Scripturalism really is. He assumes that it means propositions found only in the Bible are true and constitute as knowledge — they exclude deduction as knowledge because they say “knowledge by deduction” can’t be found in the Bible. Though I have a weak grasp of Scripturalism, I don’t believe that is what the philosophy adheres to.
This account is inaccurate in a couple of ways. First, it’s perfectly obvious to me that Scripturalism does not include the claim that “propositions found only in the Bible are true”. Indeed, I’ve never incorporated such a claim into my definition of Scripturalism. Rather, my definition of Scripturalism comes from p. 43 of Cheung’s “Systematic Theology,” and indeed is constituted by a quote from that page:
Scripture is the first principle of the Christian worldview, so that true knowledge consists of only what is directly stated in Scripture and what is validly deducible from Scripture; all other propositions amount to unjustified opinion at best. This biblical epistemology necessarily follows from biblical metaphysics. Any other epistemology is indefensible, and unavoidably collapses into self-contradictory skepticism. (p. 43; cf. “Systematic Theology,” p. 18 para. 4, p. 22 para. 5, p. 41 fn. 42)
… and nothing more, and nothing less. And from the simple fact that Cheung claims to know that Scripturalism is true, it follows that Scripturalism is incoherent. The argument was given in the original Response.
As some have put it, we must distinguish between alethic Scripturalism (there are no true propositions except propositions of Scripture and propositions validly deducible from propositions of Scripture) and epistemic Scripturalism (no propositions are known by human beings, except propositions of Scripture and propositions validly deducible from propositions of Scripture). Epistemic Scripturalism does not entail alethic Scripturalism, for presumably some propositions can be true but unknown by human beings.
The upshot is that Cheung’s epistemic Scripturalism, conveyed in the last quote above, is absurd enough without saddling it with the additional absurdity of alethic Scripturalism, much less Cheung’s readers saddling me with a claim I never made.
Second, Cheung’s reader claims that people like me “exclude deduction as knowledge because they say ‘knowledge by deduction’ can’t be found in the Bible.” No, that’s not what I argue at all. Indeed, in my original response I explicitly registered my agreement with the claim (which I called SS2) that propositions validly deduced from Scriptural propositions are themselves objects of knowledge. That is, I include valid deduction as knowledge; I don’t exclude it. Rather, what I argued is that Cheung’s claim about valid deduction being a knowledge-extending form of inference, is neither contained in Scripture nor validly deducible from propositions of Scripture. Thus, Cheung’s claim about valid deduction is in conflict with his Scripturalism. Since Cheung’s claim about valid deduction is partly constitutive of his Scripturalism, this means that his Scripturalism is self-referentially incoherent.
Cheung goes on and on about how many ‘fallacies’ are in my original Response, but unfortunately he only bothers to identify two potential candidates: my understanding of Scripturalism, and my claims about the innate knowledge spoken of in Ro 1-2.
My claims about Scripturalism
Here is Cheung’s first substantive criticism, in full:
To address your example (assuming that you have accurately represented Mucsauqa’s point), it has always been the claim of Scripturalists that infallible knowledge consists of all the biblical propositions plus all of their necessary implications. Logically speaking, the latter are not really additions to the biblical propositions at all, since all the necessary implications of a proposition are already inherent in the proposition, so that if the necessary implications are excluded, logically speaking, the proposition itself is also excluded. So it is a strange objection to say that Scripturalists cannot be correct or coherent because they also affirm what is necessarily deduced from the biblical propositions, since they have never restricted themselves to the biblical propositions apart from their necessary implications. Rather, they affirm that what is validly or necessarily deduced from revealed propositions is equally as certain as what is explicitly revealed.
First, notice that when Cheung offers his definition of knowledge in the quote above, it is only a part of the definition he gives in “Systematic Theology,” p. 43. In the above, Cheung says that knowledge “consists of all the biblical propositions plus all of their necessary implications”. But of course, he goes further in his other works. In “Systematic Theology” Cheung does not merely say that knowledge consists of biblical propositions plus all propositions validly deducible from biblical propositions. In addition, he says that “all other propositions amount to unjustified opinion at best.“ To use the symbolism of my earlier Response, Cheung does not only assert SS1 and SS2 as part of his position; he asserts SEP as well. (And then SGP is simply the claim that the other three claims are either propositions of Scripture or validly deducible from propositions of Scripture.)
In other words, in reply to his reader’s email, Cheung rehearses for us his belief in SS1 and SS2, but his belief in SEP is nowhere to be found. But of course my proof that Scripturalism is self-referentially incoherent crucially involves taking note of Cheung’s advocacy of SEP.
So we should just put the question to Cheung, for the benefit of his readers: does he really believe that “all other propositions” which are neither “directly stated in Scripture” nor “validly deducible from Scripture,” are such that they “amount to unjustified opinion at best”? That is, does Cheung restrict all knowledge to propositions of Scripture and propositions validly deducible from Scripture? For if so, then he’s got a self-referential incoherence problem on his hands, because the restriction in question is neither a proposition of Scripture nor validly deducible from Scripture. Simply put, given Scripturalism, he can’t know that a constitutive element of Scripturalism is true.
Notice that my argument doesn’t involve a denial of Scripturalism, but rather a temporary affirmation of it, in order to see where its consequences lie.
Where does Scripture say (or validly imply) that all knowledge is restricted to Scripture and valid deductions from Scripture? Anywhere? These were simple questions posed to Cheung in the original Response, but he hasn’t taken the time to answer them. Presumably, it should just take a minute, shouldn’t it? After all, Scripturalism is at the heart of his version of the Christian worldview.
Second, we should thank Cheung for his clarity at the end of the above quote from his blog entry, for he has performed a service for us as to what Scripturalists affirm. According to Cheung, Scripturalists
affirm that what is validly or necessarily deduced from revealed propositions is equally as certain as what is explicitly revealed.
Let’s formalize this a bit, just so that we have the precise claim in front of us. According to Cheung, Scripturalists affirm the following:
[STC] “What is validly or necessarily deduced from revealed propositions is equally as certain as what is explicitly revealed.” (Let’s call this the Scripturalist Thesis about Certainty, or STC.)
Cheung says that he affirms STC, as do all Scripturalists, apparently. Now, STC is quite an interesting claim, and makes reference to not one but several epistemologically-significant concepts: validity, necessity, deduction, propositions, being as certain as, explicitly revealed.
From what I can recall (if my memory has failed me here, perhaps Cheung can correct me), the Bible nowhere has anything to say about any of these epistemologically-significant concepts. But let that pass. Here is the important question: is STC a proposition of Scripture or validly deducible from propositions of Scripture? For if not, then what Scripturalists “affirm” at this point doesn’t constitute knowledge, given Scripturalism. But if Cheung doesn’t know STC, why is he going around affirming it?
Notice that in my original Response, I raised similar questions about propositions like SS2 and SEP, things Cheung also affirms. Are those propositions – so central to the definition of Scripturalism – either propositions of Scripture or validly deducible from propositions of Scripture?
It seems to me that if Cheung’s Scripturalism were correct, a reply to these points would be unimaginably simple. All Cheung has to do is provide for us the valid deduction from propositions of Scripture to SS2, SEP, and STC. Indeed, just providing one of these deductions would be helpful. Since Cheung goes around confidently affirming things like SS2, SEP, and STC, surely the deductions are close at hand. Let’s have them.
So rather than actually responding to my original critique of Scripturalism, Cheung has offered up yet one more proposition (STC) that doesn’t look like it would qualify as knowledge if Scripturalism were true. That is, his reply has only increased our puzzlement about Scripturalism, rather than dispelled it.
Again, these propositions are not some esoteric theological flights of fancy with which Cheung has little familiarity. Rather, they are at the heart of his Christian worldview, and the bread-and-butter of his apologetic system. Surely he can offer us a little help here. Just what is the biblical basis for these propositions? As it stands, since it looks like they are entailed by Scripturalism but not by Scripture, it looks like Scripturalism is self-referentially incoherent.
Perhaps Cheung thinks he might have a way out here, with his distinction between knowledge and opinion. To that distinction we now turn.
Knowledge vs. opinion
Immediately after the above cited paragraph, Cheung says this:
Then, although I affirm that only the biblical propositions and their implications are infallible, I never said that these are the only propositions by which we function. Instead, I entertain many extra-biblical propositions in my daily thinking and living — nevertheless, only as opinion, not infallible revealed information. This allows me to function and discuss many things just as the non-Scripturalists do, only that I make a clear distinction between fallible opinion and infallible revelation, and I never elevate opinion to the level of revelation. And when it comes to apologetics, my opinion is not my religion, so it is not what I defend; therefore, it is no problem for me to acknowledge that I hold to some things as my fallible opinion, but that when it comes to my biblical worldview, I hold to it as infallible revelation.
First, notice that Cheung reminds us that he affirms the equivalent of SEP. That is, “only the biblical propositions and their implications are infallible” (my italics). Of course, to reconcile this with his statement in “Systematic Theology” p. 43, what Cheung is saying is that only the biblical propositions and their implications are known by human beings. (The fact that Cheung uses “infallible” and “knowledge” interchangeably means that he is still committed to the infallibilist constraint on knowledge, which I documented in my original Response. More on this, later.)
Second, what about “extra-biblical propositions,” that is, propositions neither contained in Scripture nor validly deducible from propositions of Scripture? In “Systematic Theology,” here’s what Cheung had to say about such propositions: “all other propositions amount to unjustified opinion at best”. In the above quote, here’s what Cheung has to say about these same propositions: they are “opinion,” they are “not infallible revealed information,” they are “not my religion,” they are “not what I defend,” they are “my fallible opinion,” and so on.
Third, and most importantly, it is wholly unclear just what this distinction between knowledge and opinion is supposed to do for Cheung. It’s not as if any of my criticisms of Cheung were predicated on Cheung denying this distinction! Indeed, by so carefully explaining the difference between SS1, SS2, and SEP in my original Response, I made clear that Cheung does hold to the distinction between knowledge and opinion, for on his view the propositions spoken of in SS1 and SS2 constitute knowledge, while the propositions spoken of in SEP constitute “unjustified opinion”. So how exactly does this distinction between knowledge and opinion rescue Cheung from any of my criticisms? I drew attention to this distinction as a means of making my criticisms!
Cheung appears to have wholly missed the nature of the challenge that is before him. The challenge was not to confess that some of his beliefs constitute knowledge, while others of his beliefs constitute opinion. This much was taken for granted: Cheung has some knowledge, and some opinions. Indeed, I believe this about Cheung. (In fact, I hold that Cheung knows that the Bible is true, but has only an unjustified opinion about the truth of Scripturalism. But I digress.) Rather, the challenge was to explain, given Scripturalism, why Scripturalism gets classified as “knowledge” rather than as “unjustified opinion”. Can Cheung answer that one for me? Here’s a suggestion: provide the valid deduction from Scriptural propositions to the claims of Scripturalism. It should be easy, shouldn’t it? For if you can’t validly deduce Scripturalism from Scripture, then as a Scripturalist you should reject Scripturalism. This is why, unless the valid deduction can be provided, Scripturalism must be rejected as self-referentially incoherent. Registering the distinction between knowledge and opinion hardly comes close to meeting this argument. It looks wholly irrelevant.
Cheung informs us in the above paragraph that “it is no problem for me to acknowledge that I hold to some things as my fallible opinion.” That’s nice. But the fact that Cheung holds to some things as his fallible opinion was never the target of my critique. Rather, the target of my critique was that Cheung holds to Scripturalism.
Perhaps Cheung is making out the distinction between knowledge and opinion so that he can have conceptual space for saying that his belief in Scripturalism is “unjustified opinion at best,” since it is neither a proposition of Scripture nor validly deducible from propositions of Scripture. But that would be a rather pricey response, to say the least; what Scripturalist wants to go around saying that his Scripturalism is “unjustified opinion at best”? So again, it’s not clear what this distinction between knowledge and opinion is supposed to do, vis-à-vis my arguments.
Cheung closes out this part of his reply by saying:
On the other hand, the non-Scripturalist standard for considering something as “knowledge” or reliable information is quite low and irrational, and so a lot of things are considered knowledge or reliable information even when they lack rational justification, and that are really mere opinion and guesswork. The result is that their belief systems are mixtures of uncertainty and confusion, and their irrational epistemology corrodes almost every part of their noetic structure.
Notice here that Cheung merely offers a series of claims about “the non-Scripturalist standard for considering something as ‘knowledge’.” He alternately declares that it is “irrational,” not “reliable,” lacks “rational justification,” and is “mere opinion and guesswork.” He speaks of the “uncertainty” and “confusion” of others. He doesn’t offer a single argument in support of these claims. This is a bit much, coming from someone who apparently can’t be bothered to provide a direct, simple response to an argument that his Scripturalism is self-referentially incoherent. Indeed, what does Cheung know about “the non-Scripturalist standard for knowledge”? It’s not as if I have offered up and advocated an epistemological standard of my own. Why would I need to do that? Since my arguments are of the form reductio ad absurdum, all that’s needed is for me to appeal to Cheung’s epistemological standard, and derive an absurdity from that, which is exactly what I’ve done. In the above, Cheung is talking about a “standard” for knowledge that he knows nothing about. So his inferences about that standard are firmly planted in mid-air.
But let’s humor him. Notice that in the above the two bogeymen rear their ugly heads once more: the infallibilist and internalist constraints upon knowledge that I discussed at length in my earlier Response, and documented with respect to Cheung’s written work. In the above paragraph, Cheung disparages any “standard” for knowledge that admits “uncertainty”. This is the infallibilist constraint upon knowledge, and if Cheung has a valid deduction of this from Scripture, I’m all ears. Again, in the above paragraph, Cheung says that non-Scripturalists need “rational justification” if the many things they believe are to be “considered knowledge”. This is the internalist constraint upon knowledge, and again, it would be wonderful if Cheung could provide a valid deduction of this from Scripture. Since he hasn’t provided these deductions, even though I asked him to in my earlier Response, I can only conclude they really are non-revelational epistemological principles that Cheung foists upon Scripture, and indeed the entire apologetic enterprise. What else am I to think, when a Scripturalist declines to defend his views from Scripture?
Innate knowledge and Ro 1-2
Passing on from these comments about Scripturalism, knowledge, and opinion, Cheung attempts to address what he identifies as “another example” of my “fallacious” criticisms:
In his essay, he criticizes my affirmation that man’s innate knowledge has enough content and is specific enough that it corresponds only to the biblical worldview and excludes all others. He thought that this was pure assertion, and that this could not possibly have been derived from Romans 1 and 2.
This is a reference to section 2.3 of my earlier Response, where I sought to give “an example of an assertion [in Cheung’s works] that is definitely not validly deduced from propositions of Scripture.” What’s interesting here is that my point was merely one of five illustrations of a larger point. My larger point would stand, even if this particular illustration from Ro 1-2 didn’t work. This doesn’t mean that Cheung doesn’t have the right to criticize it, only that his criticism doesn’t nearly have the significance that he apparently imputes to it. Let’s face it: if you’re going to post over 3100 words in connection with some forty-one pages of criticisms, and manage to address only two of them, it would be wise to address the most central contentions of your critic, not statements that are fairly peripheral to (indeed, entirely dispensable from) his case against you.
But let’s get to the point. My claim in that particular illustration was twofold, and unfortunately Cheung has only addressed one of them. Cheung claims that the Scriptures teach the following:
[IK1] Man’s innate knowledge “is specific and detailed enough to contradict and exclude all non-Christian systems of thought,” and
[IK2] Man’s innate knowledge “is specific and detailed enough… to demand the adoption of the complete Christian revelation.”
Obviously, neither IK1 nor IK2 are propositions of Scripture (last I checked). So in order for Cheung to hold that “the Scripture teaches” IK1 and IK2, he has to make the case that both are validly deducible from propositions of Scripture. Indeed, I asked Cheung, “Where does the Bible ever teach or imply this [i.e., IK1 and IK2]?” What does Cheung say in response?
First, in his reply, Cheung addresses the truth of IK1 but not IK2. Unfortunately, since Cheung’s original claim was to know the conjunction of IK1 and IK2, his claim is still false even if IK1 is true. So my original criticism stands despite what he says here. But I digress.
Second, let’s look at Cheung’s defense of IK1. Has he provided a valid deduction of IK1 from the Scriptures? No, he has not. Here is what he says:
But Romans 1 says that this innate knowledge contains information about God’s attributes, such as eternity and power, and it is specific enough to condemn all idolatry and even something like homosexuality. Then, Romans 2 says that the moral laws have been written in the minds of men, and this information is full and specific enough to either condemn or excuse many of their daily actions. This is a lot of specific information! Thus the innate knowledge is indeed full enough to exclude all non-Christian ideas of God, and all non-Christian concepts of morality.
This is instructive, is it not? Cheung talks about what “Romans 1 says,” but he never bothers to give a valid deduction from the Scriptures to IK1. What is the valid deduction here, such that the conclusion could not be false if the premises were true? I sincerely doubt one could be forthcoming. For instance, IK1 makes reference to “all non-Christian systems of thought”. But no text of Scripture makes reference to “systems of thought,” much less to “all non-Christian systems of thought”. How are we to get from Scripture to IK1?
Well, let’s offer Cheung a little help here. In the above, perhaps Cheung is operating under the assumption that:
[AA1] Any and every form of “idolatry” constitutes a “system of thought”. (Let’s call this Additional Assumption 1.)
Now that might bolster his defense of IK1 a bit. Perhaps if man’s innate knowledge excludes all forms of idolatry, then it also excludes all non-Christian systems of thought. This would be an interesting move. Unfortunately, AA1 is neither a proposition of Scripture nor validly deducible from propositions of Scripture. So this defense of IK1 is a miserable failure, for it doesn’t provide that valid deduction from Scriptural premises alone which alone can secure knowledge for the Scripturalist. This is what happens when you bandy about large claims like IK1 but labor under the severe restrictions of Scripturalism.
Cheung continues:
Of course, this still does not offer any information on how one might receive salvation, but it is enough to condemn all non-Christians. To oppose this is to say that man’s innate knowledge is sufficient to exclude many but not all religions, and that even if God still condemns the adherents of some of these religions not excluded by man’s innate knowledge, it could not be on this basis. However, this view (a necessary implication of denying my view) would directly contradict Paul’s very point in Romans 1 and 2.
I’ve already offered enough to show that this way of reasoning is extremely lame. But here’s an additional thought, and it’s rather startling. Cheung seems to be under the impression that I reject the equivalent of IK1, and that somehow my argument against him is predicated upon this rejection. But nothing could be further from the truth. I could entirely accept IK1 and yet my original criticism would stand. For my original criticism was not that Cheung accepted something like IK1, but that he couldn’t validly deduce IK1 from Scripture. Perhaps IK1 is true, but the best argument for this is an inductive or intuitive or abductive one. (Indeed, I said as much in this section of my Response!) By focusing upon this one illustration, Cheung has completely missed the larger point behind the series of five illustrations. That point was not that Cheung’s claims about this or that Scriptural teaching were false, but rather that Cheung makes assertions about what “Scripture teaches” while failing to satisfy Scripturalist standards for knowledge.
As I put it in introducing these illustrations, “when it comes right down to it, Cheung again and again affirms propositions that are neither propositions of Scripture nor validly deducible from Scripture.” And this could be the case, even if what Cheung affirms happens to be true.
I hope this point (repeated ad nauseum throughout the section in question) is now no longer lost on Cheung, and I look forward to his interaction with what I actually said.
One final point, tangential to the main enterprise, but still interesting. In the above, Cheung says that if I reject his view about the specificity and detail of innate knowledge, then I must hold
that man’s innate knowledge is sufficient to exclude many but not all religions, and that even if God still condemns the adherents of some of these religions not excluded by man’s innate knowledge, it could not be on this basis. However, this view (a necessary implication of denying my view) would directly contradict Paul’s very point in Romans 1 and 2.
This is an interesting set of claims, all the more interesting because it completely misses one of the fundamental points of Ro 1-2. Cheung envisions someone who adheres to a religion that is “not excluded” by man’s innate knowledge, that is, a religion that is consistent with man’s innate knowledge. Cheung is saying, in effect, ‘Let’s say that Aquascum is right, and there could be such people. Well, on what basis could God possibly condemn such people?! After all, their religion is consistent with their innate knowledge! Aquascum would have to say that such people get off scot-free!”
Let me offer a suggestion: perhaps God would condemn such people because they failed to live up to what they knew to be true. And, indeed, is this not Paul’s point throughout Ro 1-2? This is astonishing to me. Apparently, Cheung believes that if someone starts a religion based on (and consistent with) his innate knowledge alone, then God could never condemn such a person with reference to his innate knowledge. What perverse exegesis is this? According to Paul, God doesn’t condemn people because they have innate knowledge, but because they suppress it and fail to live up to it. The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men (Ro 1:18). Even though they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks (Ro 1:21). They worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator (Ro 1:25). They are those who know the ordinance of God, that those who practice such things are worthy of death, and yet they not only do the same [i.e., practice such things], but also give hearty approval to those who practice them (Ro 1:32). God will render to each person according to his deeds (Ro 2:6). There is no one who does good, not even one (Ro 3:12). Suffice it to say, God has ample basis for condemning sinful man, even if something like IK1 were false. All God has to do is find, not some failure of their innate knowledge to exclude all non-Christian religions (of what relevance is that?!), but a failure for them to live up to that which they knew to be true. (But, just as a reminder, my argument was not predicated on the falsity of IK1 anyway, so Cheung’s whole reply is a non sequitur, as I brought out above.)
So it’s not just that Cheung can’t manage to validly deduce his claims from Scripture (and so satisfy the epistemological demands of his Scripturalism). It’s that Cheung – at least at this small juncture – doesn’t have a firm grasp on the propositions of Scripture themselves.
Cheung offers us a lament:
Anyway, errors like this pervade every section in his essay, so that it is just one overwhelming series of fallacies, and fallacies upon fallacies. How am I to handle such an essay? Am I expected to refute every single point? But do you notice how long it takes just to barely address several relevant points with adequate clarity?
Here’s a suggestion: for maximum impact upon his readers, Cheung should try to refrain from outlandish, unproven claims about “every section in [my] essay,” and instead try to manage at least one cogent bit of reply for every 3100 words he spends in that connection. Is that too hard to ask? That if you’re going to bother to reply to anything someone says, at least take the time to say something relevant, to the extent that you say anything at all? I too lament the fact that Cheung has used so many words to address only two of my points, and it’s a tragedy that he didn’t have anything cogent to say.
Criticism and epistemology
Cheung closes the first section of his blog entry (which is the only section of any relevance to my actual arguments) with a few paragraphs about my own alleged responsibility to provide my own “epistemology” if I am going to critique him. Cheung says:
Finally, notice that Mucsauqa fails to provide and justify his own positive construction, his own positive epistemology and philosophy, only by which he could criticize me in the first place. Always remember this point — this point alone will kill every opposition whose basic presuppositions (especially on epistemology) are different from the Scripturalist.
For someone who has “slowly read several specific places” in my original Response, Cheung apparently didn’t read the places that would have helped him the most in his reply. In the above, Cheung simply falls back upon his internalist constraint on knowledge, documented at length in my response (and thus begs the question against my critical examination of his use of that constraint). On Cheung’s view, Cheung is immune from criticism unless the critic can prove how he (the critic) has knowledge. Apparently, nothing anyone says constitutes knowledge unless he can say how he knows it, or can show that he knows it. Again, is this constraint on knowledge a proposition of Scripture or validly deducible from Scripture? Let’s see the proof of this from Cheung. Is Cheung wielding a bit of knowledge here, or “unjustified opinion at best”? According to Cheung’s own Scripturalist epistemology, I’m afraid, it’s the latter.
(Notice that, in the above, I am only applying to Cheung a standard which he himself accepts. If he really thinks that there is an internalist constraint on knowledge, such that I’m really obligated to submit to his particular epistemological demands, then of course he can’t know this unless he knows how he knows this (since that’s precisely what the internalist constraint demands of Cheung). So how does he know this? By way of contrast, Cheung is repeatedly applying to me a standard for knowledge which I have never endorsed. In other words, my criticisms of Cheung only hold him to his own espoused standards, whereas Cheung’s criticisms of me attempt to foist on the discussion a double standard. The prejudicial asymmetry here is plain for all to see.)
Perhaps most importantly, Cheung fails to note the nature of a reductio ad absurdum, which is the form most of my arguments took in my original Response. The one who gives a reductio ad absurdum is under no responsibility to prove the premises of his reductio, or explain how he knows the premises of his reductio. That would be inane, since the whole point of a reductio is to claim that the premises must be false (since they lead to an absurdity). So it’s time to point something out to Cheung: the premises of my reductio (in its various forms) are premises which he accepts. So even if I have no idea how people get knowledge, Cheung’s position would still be reduced to absurdity, for the argument appeals to things he already accepts.
Cheung can of course challenge the soundness of my reductio very easily: point out for us which premises of my arguments are premises which he doesn’t accept. Failing that, it looks like Cheung’s own position (on Scripturalism, on infallibilism, on internalism, on occasionalism) is self-referentially incoherent. Whether or not I know anything about epistemology is quite beside the point.
Cheung continues:
For example, if he opposes my occasionalism and my anti-empiricism, then what is his epistemology, and how is it rationally justified?
But no one needs an “epistemology” at all, to point out that Cheung’s own position is self-referentially incoherent. That’s the beauty of a reductio ad absurdum. It doesn’t operate off of your own premises, but off the premises of your interlocutor. If Cheung doesn’t think my arguments against his Scripturalism and occasionalism actually work, then he’s free to point out where they go wrong. But why are my beliefs relevant to the soundness of his epistemological and apologetic positions? Here’s what relevant to the soundness of Cheung’s own views: Cheung’s own views. The fact that Cheung apparently misses this is of enormous significance.
Once again, in the above Cheung is appealing to his internalist constraint on knowledge. In particular, Cheung is appealing to the following:
[SCC] If person P’s criticisms of Vincent Cheung are going to be sound, then P must have an epistemology in which those criticisms are rationally justified. (Let’s call this the Scripturalist Constraint on Criticism, or SCC.)
Here’s the question: is SCC a proposition of Scripture or validly deducible from propositions of Scripture? If not, then given Cheung’s own Scripturalism SCC is “unjustified opinion at best”. And if that’s the case, what is Cheung doing foisting unjustified opinion on his interlocutor?
The beauty of all of this is that Cheung has already advertised what his epistemology is. That’s why I can hold him to his own epistemological standards; they are clearly stated for us. That’s the price you pay for offering an epistemological opinion, and a dogmatic one at that. By way of contrast, I haven’t so much as divulged anything like an epistemological stance. So how can Cheung hold me to a view I haven’t so much as espoused or endorsed? As Greg Bahnsen would put it, Cheung has given us just enough rope to hang him with. By way of contrast, I haven’t so much as given Cheung a ball of twine. So what is he doing fashioning a rope out of mid-air? What a magical hangman that would be J.
Cheung continues:
How can HE read my books and then criticize them, unless he is a scriptural occasionalist like me, or unless he has justified empiricism? If he is the former, then we agree and there is no problem; if he can’t do the latter, then he completely fails before he even begins.
Here’s Cheung’s favorite refrain: how? how? how? how? It is the refrain of the internalist about knowledge, essentially talking to himself but to no one else. On Cheung’s view, you can’t criticize him unless that which grounds your knowledge of your own criticisms is cognitively accessible to you, such that you have a ready epistemology at hand for every claim you make. Not only is this stance in conflict with his occasionalism, according to which God gives even unbelievers knowledge by divine illumination, quite apart from their assuming a Christian worldview. It is also in conflict with his Scripturalism, because the internalist constraint on knowledge is neither a proposition of Scripture nor validly deducible from propositions of Scripture. Therefore Cheung must depart from his espoused epistemology twice over, in order to consistently forbid others from criticizing him. Cheung’s worldview is self-referentially incoherent both in theory and in practice. What a mess!
Cheung’s argument in the paragraph above is a total non sequitur. Let’s say I have no idea how I “read his books and then criticize them”. What follows from this? That my arguments are a failure? How could this possibly follow, since my arguments operate off of Cheung’s premises and not my own?! If Cheung believes I am sneaking in a premise which he doesn’t accept, then let him identify it for us, rather than saying how? how? how? how?
To put it yet another way, it doesn’t matter if I can justify the premises I use. What matters is whether the premises I use are justified. And since those premises are Cheung’s premises, if he rejects them then he is rejecting his own views. That’s why reductio ad absurdum is such a powerful method of argumentation, as Cheung knows so well (he uses it repeatedly on his empiricist detractors). Surely we don’t have a situation here where Cheung can dish it out but he can’t take it. Do we?
-- Aquascum