Of Minds and Mozzies

5 thoughts on “Of Minds and Mozzies”

  1. strangebaptistfire

    Dr. Anderson,

    Would the same follow in the following examples?

    1. Given epiphenomenalism, if there is no mind > body causation, why is it that I have an adrenal dump when startled by another person?

    2. Given eliminative materialism, if there is no mind, why do I have an adrenal dump at all?

    Thanks,

    Dusman

    1. I don’t think your examples would be problematic for epiphenomenalists or eliminative materialists. In the first case, we have a chemical reaction to an external sensory stimulus: no problem for an epiphenomenalist. In the second case, you merely have a chemical reaction: no problem for an eliminative materialist.

      The difference is that an itch is a mental phenomenon (an experience) whereas an adrenal dump is a physical phenomenon (a chemical reaction). Right?

  2. strangebaptistfire

    Dr. Anderson,

    I didn’t mention the psychological duress associated with the physiological process. With the adrenal dump (a.k.a., “fight or flight” response), would it not also be reckoned an experience vs. a mere physiological reaction based on external stimuli since there is a physiological feedback loop that can lead to further psychological duress? After all, the increased heart rate, sweating, etc. associated with said response often causes a psychological disposition that can then lead to further physiological/psychological changes (i.e., hyperventilation, fainting via sudden hypotension, panic attacks, etc.).

    Given those features, it appears that the epiphenomenalist program cannot account for it.

    Same would go for eliminative materialism.

    Is that right or am I still missing it?

    1. Thanks for clarifying!

      If there’s a genuine psychological-physiological feedback loop, then that certainly would be a problem for epiphenomenalism. But I suppose the epiphenomenalist would argue that despite appearances it’s really just a physiological feedback loop with an epiphenomenal psychological rider. That’s why supposed cases of mind-body feedback loops aren’t so effective as counterexamples against epiphenomenalism. In contrast, cases where a mental event is unambiguously the first cause are more effective (e.g., to confirm of the falsity of epiphenemonalism I decide to imagine a chocolate cake and consequently begin to salivate: QED).

      However, the scenario you describe is clearly still a problem for eliminative materialism, as is any scenario involving a genuine first-person experience.

  3. strangebaptistfire

    Dr. Anderson,

    I figured that’s the defeater the epiphenomenalist would go for. However, the example of the chocolate cake > salivation is a good one indeed.

    Thanks,

    Dusman

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